Penalty Clauses and the Recent Decisions by the UK Supreme Court in Cavendish v. Makdessi & ParkingEye v. Beavis by Schelhaas, H.N. (Harriët)
Penalty Clauses and the Recent Decisions by the UK
Supreme Court in Cavendish v. Makdessi & ParkingEye
v. Beavis
Harriët N. SCHELHAAS*
Abstract: The UK Supreme court recently rendered two important decisions on
penalty clauses: Cavendish v. Makdessi and ParkingEye v. Beavis. The penalty
clause is a controversial legal concept in Europe because it can result in high and
unreasonable payment obligations. Most European legal systems agree that some
form of protection against unreasonable penalty clauses is needed, but differ in the
way penalty clauses are restricted. The most extreme approach is followed by
English law, where a distinction is made between invalid penalty clauses and valid
liquidated damages clauses. The new UK Supreme Court cases introduce new
elements in English law in this respect. In this issue, the two decisions are
discussed from a comparative perspective by a number of authors from different
legal systems (English & Welsh, Belgian, German, Dutch, French, Italian, Swedish
and Polish law).
1. The Use of Penalty Clauses
Agreed payment clauses fix in advance the amount that a non-performing party has
to pay in case of non-performance. In the English legal terminology, these clauses
are called penalty clauses and liquidated damages clauses. Herein, the common
term ‘penalty clause’ refers to agreed payment clauses in general; that is, the
English legal concepts of penalty and liquidated damages clauses.
Historically, a penalty clause may serve two functions.1 Firstly, it may aim to
ascertain in advance the amount of damages that the injured party may claim,
thereby avoiding litigation for the assessment of damages. Secondly, the penalty
clause may primarily provide for an incentive (or: penalty) for the other party to
adequately perform his or her contractual obligations. Here, the penalty clause
exceeds the likely damage or may be claimed in addition to statutory damages in
order to induce the other party to perform. In some legal systems, this form of
penalty clause is said to punish the non-performing party.
By contractually fixing a high payment obligation in case of non-
performance, it becomes more likely that the other party will adequately perform
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his or her contractual duties. Therefore, a penalty clause aims to assist legal
certainty and is widely used in legal practice.
2. Different Approaches
However, the penalty clause is a controversial legal concept because it may result
in high and unreasonable payment obligations and therefore not only compen-
sates for the damages a contracting party suffers. The question arises as to
whether contractual parties are allowed to agree on any form of penalty clause
or whether protection is needed. Most European legal systems agree that some
form of protection against unreasonable penalty clauses is needed,2 but differ in
terms of how penalty clauses are restricted. The most extreme approach is
followed by English law, which makes a distinction between penalty clauses and
liquidated damages clauses. Where the latter are valid and enforceable, the
former are not. Other jurisdictions, such as the Dutch, do not make a distinction
between penalty and liquidated damages clauses and consider them both valid,
subject to the possibility that a court reduces or supplements unfair agreed
payment clauses. Other legal systems consider both penalty and liquidated
damages clauses as valid, but do make a distinction between the two clauses:
only penalty clauses are subject to judicial control. Due to the fact that the legal
approach to penalty clauses differs throughout Europe, penalty clauses have
received considerable attention in academia.3
3. Important Decisions by the UK Supreme Court in Cavendish
v. Makdessi and ParkingEye v. Beavis
As mentioned above, the most extreme approach is to be found in the United
Kingdom, where penalty clauses are not valid.4 Parties are only allowed to make
an assessment of the likely damage in advance (‘a liquidated damages clause’) and
may not agree on payments of an amount in excess of such assessment (‘penalty
clause’). In order to distinguish between the two clauses, Lord Dunedin formulated
2 Even though Swedish law lacks specific provisions on penalty clauses, it restricts unreasonable
penalty clauses on the basis of Swedish Contract Act s. 36 on unconscionable contracts: see
Christina RAMBERG in her case note from a Swedish perspective.
3 See in ERPL (‘European Review of Private Law’), for instance, H.G. BEALE, ‘Penalty Clauses in
English Law’, 3&4. ERPL (European Review of Private Law) 2016, pp 353–372 and the contribu-
tions on penalty clauses under German, French, Italian, Common and European law in 3 ERPL
2015, pp 283–383. According to Jansen, this attention is caused by the fact that the law on
penalties reveals a striking difference between common law and civil law: A. JANSSEN, ‘Editorial:
Die Vertragsstrafe im Brennpunkt der Rechtsvergleichung’, 3. ERPL 2015, p 203.
4 In 1998 Belgian law adopted a similar approach: see H.N. SCHELHAAS, Het boetebeding in het
Europese contractenrecht (Deventer: Kluwer 2004), p 156 ff.
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in the Dunlop case5 various tests ‘which if applicable to the case under considera-
tion may prove helpful, or even conclusive’. All tests boiled down to the question of
whether the parties at the time of contracting made a genuine assessment of the
likely damages. Lord Dunedin’s tests survived and were applied for around a
century, until 4 November 2015. On that date, UK Supreme Court rendered two
decisions on penalty clauses (Cavendish v. Makdessi and ParkingEye v. Beavis)6 in
which the UK Supreme Court reformulated the distinction between valid liquidated
damages clauses and invalid penalty clauses. The Supreme Court’s press release
stated the following7:
The penalty rule is an ‘ancient, haphazardly constructed edifice which has not
weathered well’. However, it is of long standing and a similar rule exists in all
other developed systems of law. It also covers types of contract which are not
regulated in any other way. It should not therefore be abolished, but neither
should it be extended. The fundamental principle is that the penalty rule regulates
only the contractual remedy available for the breach of primary contractual
obligations, and not the fairness of those primary obligations themselves.
And:
What makes a contractual provision penal? Lord Dunedin’s tests (…) have too
often been treated as a code (…) . The concepts of ‘deterrence’ and ‘genuine pre-
estimate of loss’ are unhelpful. The true test is whether the impugned provision is
a secondary obligation which imposes a detriment on the contract-breaker out of
all proportion to any legitimate interest of the innocent party in the enforcement
of the primary obligation.
This press release already indicates that both decisions are important in relation to
Lord Dunedin’s tests to distinguish penalty clauses from liquidated damages clauses
and that they introduce new elements into the English law on penalty clauses.
4. Comparative Case Notes
Given the importance of the two recent penalty clause decisions by the UK
Supreme Court, the question arises as whether these decisions bring English law
closer to the other European approaches in relation to penalty clauses. It is for this
5 UKHL 1 July 1914, Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v. New Garage & Motor Co Ltd http://www.
bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1914/1.html.
6 UKSC 4 November 2015, Cavendish Square Holdings BV v. Makdessi; ParkingEye Ltd v. Beavis
http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKSC/2015/67.html
7 https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/uksc-2013-0280-press-summary.pdf.
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reason that, in this issue of ERPL, both decisions are commented on from a
comparative perspective by a number of authors from different legal systems.
Each author takes both decisions of the UK Supreme Court as a starting point
and comments on the cases from the perspective of its own national legal system.
The author also answers the question of whether a court in a different legal system
would have answered the questions that were raised in Cavendish v. Makdessi and
ParkingEye v. Beavis the same, and whether English law draws nearer to the other
legal systems under study.
After this short introduction of the topic, the cases are first discussed from
an English and Welsh perspective by Paula GILIKER. Subsequently, Françoise
AUVRAY and Sanne JANSEN discuss Belgian law, which adopts the same principles
as English law in this respect. Florian FAUST analyses both cases from a German
perspective, after which the cases are discussed against the background of Dutch
law. Michel CANNARSA deals with the French perspective, followed by Francesco
Paolo PATTI on Italian law. Those more traditional legal systems are supplemented
with an analysis from a Swedish perspective by Christina RAMBERG, and with a
Polish perspective by Ewa BAGIŃSKA and Paulina ŚLUFIŃSKA. This rich collection of
case notes will be concluded with a brief comparative analysis in which some
conclusions will be drawn.
172
